Teaching Freedom: Exclusionary Rights of Student Groups by Howarth, Joan W.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-2008
Teaching Freedom: Exclusionary Rights of Student
Groups
Joan W. Howarth
Michigan State University College of Law, howarth@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons,
Education Law Commons, Juveniles Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joan W. Howarth, Teaching Freedom: Exclusionary Rights of Student Groups, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 889 (2008-2009).
Teaching Freedom:
Exclusionary Rights of Student
Groups
Joan W. Howarth*
Progressive, antisubordination values support robust First Amendment
protection for high school and university students, including strong rights of
expressive association, even when those rights clash with educational
institutions' nondiscrimination policies. The leading cases addressing the
conflicts between nondiscrimination policies and exclusionary student
groups are polarized and distorted by their culture war context. That
context tainted the leading authority, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, and is
especially salient in the student expressive association cases, many of which
are being aggressively litigated by religious groups with strong
antihomosexuality goals. The strength of these First Amendment claims can
be difficult to recognize in this context. Dean Howarth attempts to hold new
ground, in which protecting the First Amendment association rights of
exclusion by even antihomosexual student groups is consistent with a deep
commitment to improved justice for sexual minorities. Dean Howarth
discusses the leading high school and law school cases, and presents the
strong First Amendment doctrinal analysis that should control. She
critiques as weak the equality claim at stake in preventing a faith-based
student group from limiting its membership and officers to adherents of that
faith. To the contrary, nondiscrimination and equality for sexual minorities
may be strengthened by greater separation between the expressive identities
of educational institutions and those of student groups in the public forums
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established by the schools or universities. This is especially true in light of
Establishment Clause developments that now protect religious groups within
public schools and universities. Further, implementation principles can
control the discriminatory impact within an institution of a discriminatory
student group. In sum, forcing faith-based student organizations to abide by
school or university nondiscrimination policies does not significantly
advance equality and nondiscrimination rights for sexual minorities.
Recognizing the First Amendment rights of even antihomosexual student
organizations may be, in fact, the better path to LGBT rights and school
environments in which LGBT students will have the safety, security, and
support in which they can thrive.
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INTRODUCTION
Who should win when student groups' First Amendment expressive
rights clash with schools' nondiscrimination policies? This conflict
arises when faith-based student organizations assert their rights to
exclude students who do not subscribe to the groups' statements of
faith, in apparent violation of the educational institution's policies
prohibiting religious discrimination. If the religious group's creed
includes opposition to homosexuality, the group's insistence on
limiting membership to those who accept the creed may also implicate
institutional policies prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation. When the school has established a limited public forum
and the group's exclusionary criteria is central to its identity,
expressive association rights should trump nondiscrimination policies.
Once a school or university establishes a limited public forum of
student organizations,' under the logic of Roberts v. United States
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
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Jaycees2 and Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte,3 ideological
or faith-based student groups have expressive association rights to use
their ideology or faith as a membership requirement. For instance, the
High School Democrats can limit their membership and leadership to
people who agree with the Democratic party, otherwise known as
Democrats; the Vegetarian Society can limit its membership to
students who support vegetarianism, even limiting the group to
students who pledge not to eat meat; and the Christian Legal Society
("CLS") should be able to limit its membership and leadership to
people who share its version of the Christian faith.
Few of us would spend much energy defending the right of a person
who eats bacon for breakfast, burgers for lunch, and steak for dinner
to become the President of the Vegetarian Society. Turning over the
core values of the Vegetarian Society to meat-lovers could compromise
its agenda beyond recognition. That, in short, explains why the First
Amendment protects the right of expressive associations to exclude
from membership and leadership those who do not support the core
values of the association. The vegetarian example is simple, however,
because educational institutions generally do not have policies that
prohibit discrimination against carnivores. The issues are more
complex when the school's nondiscrimination policy comes into play,
such as if the CLS wants to restrict its membership to people who
accept its doctrine, in apparent violation of a policy prohibiting
discrimination based on religion or sexual orientation.
Others also have argued that the First Amendment protects the right
of student organizations in a limited public forum to control their
membership based on the group's faith or ideology,4 but this Article
(1995) (explaining that university created limited public forum by funding multiple
student newspapers with diverse perspectives).
2 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
3 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
4 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on "Equal Access" for Religious
Speakers and Groups, 29 UC DAvis L. REv. 653 (1996) (discussing interaction between
Establishment Clause and First Amendment freedom of speech); Charles J. Russo and
William E. Thro, The Constitutional Rights of Politically Incorrect Groups: Christian
Legal Society v. Walker as an Illustration, 33 J.C. & U.L. 361 (2006) (exploring Walker
in light of constitutional rights of "politically incorrect" collegiate organizations);
Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public University Antidiscrimination
Policies and Religious Student Organizations, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2882 (2005) (arguing
that applying nondiscrimination policies that directly conflict with the core values of
religious student groups challenges First Amendment protected freedom of
association); Richard M. Paul Ill & Derek Rose, Comment, The Clash Between the First
Amendment and Civil Rights: Public University Nondiscrimination Clauses, 60 Mo. L.
[Vol. 42:889
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may be distinctive in two ways. First, my analysis rests in part on
skepticism about the line of Establishment Clause authority that has
invited faith-based student organizations into public schools and
universities.' Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, my argument is
grounded in a deep commitment to equality and improved justice for
members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender ("LGBT")
communities. But forcing faith-based student organizations to abide by
school or university nondiscrimination policies does not significantly
advance equality and nondiscrimination rights for sexual minorities. To
the contrary, recognizing the First Amendment rights of even
antihomosexual student organizations may be, in fact, the better path to
LGBT rights and school environments in which LGBT students will
have the safety, security, and support in which they can thrive.
Progressive, antisubordination values support robust First
Amendment protection for high school and university students,
including strong rights of expressive association. Morse v. Frederick,6
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,7 and Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District8 have established that "the
REV. 889 (1995) (exploring right of university religious organizations to discriminate
based on sexual orientation); Mark Andrew Snider, Note, Viewpoint Discrimination by
Public Universities: Student Religious Organizations and Violations of University
Nondiscrimination Policies, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841 (2004) (examining how court
should reconcile derecognized student organization's freedom of association with
university's goal of total nondiscrimination on campus); Ryan C. Visser, Note,
Collision Course?: Christian Legal Society v. Kane Could Create a Split over the Right of
Religious Student Groups to Associate in the Face of Law School Antidiscrimination
Policies, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 449 (2007) (considering potential circuit split regarding
whether CLS should be required to follow university nondiscrimination policies); cf.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Student Religious Organizations and University Policies Against
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Implications of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 21 J.C. & U.L. 369 (1994) (arguing that religious student organization
had RFRA rights, grounded in equal access and free exercise, to exemption from
university policy prohibiting discrimination on basis of sexual orientation). But see,
e.g., Anne K. Knight, Note, Striking the Balance Between Anti-Discrimination Laws and
First Amendment Freedoms: An Alternative Proposal to Preserve Diversity, 30 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 249 (2007) (forcing student groups to comply with
nondiscrimination policies does not violate First Amendment); Christian A. Malanga,
Note, Expressive Association - Student Organizations' Right to Discriminate: A Look at
Public Law Schools' Nondiscrimination Policies and Their Application to Christian Legal
Society Chapters, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 757 (2007) (arguing that notwithstanding
groups' First Amendment expressive rights, enforcement of nondiscrimination policies
on CLS chapters and other religious-based student groups is justified).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 145-54.
6 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
7 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
8 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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rights of students 'must be "applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment."' 9 High schools (and later
colleges and universities) are training grounds for participatory
democracy, particularly as they provide opportunities for students to
experience and grow into values of autonomy, pluralism, and
equality.'1  The most crucial special characteristics of the school
environment are those that reinforce the school's role as launching
pad for effective participation in a vibrant democracy.11
The First Amendment protects expressive associations because they
are identity-forming, idea-forming entities. 2 This is why encouraging a
variety of autonomous student groups is a central aspect of many
schools' missions of preparing students to participate effectively in
democracy. As Seana Shiffrin aptly claims, "Associations have an
intimate connection to freedom of speech values in large part because
they are special sites for the generation and germination of thoughts and
ideas." 13  Expressive associations create opportunities for self-
expression, advocacy, tolerance, and autonomy. Schools may teach
those values best by facilitating public forums for student organizations.
The link between First Amendment freedoms and democratic
participation attaches high value to students' free expression,
including student control of student organizations, even when those
student rights conflict with institutional nondiscrimination policies.
Just as training wheels do not guarantee the safety of novice bike
riders, educational laboratories for democracy cannot eliminate all
risks of freedom or complexities of equality. Pluralism and freedom
do not translate into a right not to be offended or even hurt. 4 In
I Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (internal
citations omitted)).
10 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing role of public
schools in educating young citizens on importance of participating in democracy).
I See generally Colin M. Macleod, A Liberal Theory of Freedom of Expression for
Children, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2004) (theorizing about preparing children for
adult roles in democracy).
12 See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled
Association?, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 839 (2005) (arguing that First Amendment value of
expressive association is grounded not as much on external message of association as
it is on association as site for development of autonomous thought); id. at 840-41
(describing expressive associations as "special sites for generation and germination of
thought and ideas").
13 Id. at 840-41.
14 Andrew Koppelman, You Can't Hurry Love: Why Anti-discrimination Protections
for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 144-45 (2006)
(challenging notion that "none of us needs to hear things that will hurt us"); id. at 126
("[Clonservative Christians ... like gay people, should be able to say what they
[Vol. 42:889
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addition, we diminish our lessons about equality by insisting to
students that equality means the right of a Republican to join the
Democratic Club, the right of a meat-lover to join the Vegetarian
Society, or the right of a Muslim to lead the CLS.
The Second and Ninth Circuits have addressed conflicts between
high school religious student organizations and nondiscrimination
policies in Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District No. 315 and Truth v.
Kent School District,6 respectively. Hsu upheld the right of a high
school Christian organization to limit its officers to Christians, 7 but
the court in Truth was deeply skeptical of any right of a Christian
student group to limit its membership to Christians. The CLS has
pressed similar issues at law schools across the country, achieving
many negotiated victories, 8 a Seventh Circuit victory in Christian
Legal Society v. Walker, 9 and a defeat in the Northern District of
California in Christian Legal Society v. Kane,2° currently on appeal to
the Ninth Circuit.2' The CLS cases escalate the intensity of the
believe, however distressing that may be to their fellow citizens.").
15 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996).
16 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Truth II], amending 524 F.3d 957 (9th
Cir. 2008), vacating Truth v. Grohe, 499 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Truth I].
17 See infra text accompanying notes 39-62.
The CLS claims victories through negotiation or settlement of litigation at the
University of South Carolina (see Press Release, ADF, CLS Suit Prompts Univ. of S.C. to
Correct Funding Inequities (June 23, 2008), available at http://www.alliancedefensefund.
org/news/story.aspx?cid=4577 (last visitedJune 26, 2008)); Florida State University (see
Press Release, Christian Legal Society, Florida State Student Senate Reverses Its Decision
to Pull Funding from Christian Legal Society (Feb. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.clsnet.org/clrfPages/pr-CLSvFSU.php); Ohio State University (see New Ohio
State Policy Allows Religious Groups to Exclude Non-Believers, THE AssOCIATED PRESS STATE
& LOCAL WIRE, Oct. 1, 2004, at 1, available at LexisNexis Congressional Universe
Academic); University of Toledo (see Plaintiffs Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without
Prejudice, Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Toledo v. Johnson, No. 3:05-CV-
7126 (N.D. Ohio June 17, 2005)); and Arizona State University (see Plaintiffs
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion for Attorneys' Fees and
Costs, Christian Legal Soc'y at Arizona State Univ. v. Crow, No. CV-04-2572-PHX-
NVW (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2005)).
19 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
20 No. C 04-04484JSW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2006).
21 The Eleventh Circuit is poised to address a very similar issue in Beta Upsilon
Chi, Upsilon Chapter at the University of Florida v. Machen. In Machen, a Christian
Fraternity challenged the University of Florida's efforts to enforce its
nondiscrimination policies against it. Beta Upsilon Chi, Upsilon Chapter at the Univ.
of Fla. v. Machen, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (N.D. Fla. 2008), argued, No. 08-13332-EE
(11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008). The 11th Circuit appeal of the district court denial of the
fraternity's motion for a preliminary injunction is pending. On July 30, 2008, the
11th Circuit issued an order without opinion granting the fraternity's interlocutory
20091
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political conflict beyond that of the high school cases because the CLS
statement of faith limits membership and leadership to people who
renounce sexual activity outside of marriage, including all same-sex
sexual activity.22 Although the CLS denies that this aspect of its creed
constitutes discrimination based on sexual orientation, law schools
have challenged the CLS position as violating not only their
prohibitions against religious discrimination, but also their
prohibitions against discrimination based on sexual orientation.23
Part I of this Article describes the leading decisions that address the
tension between nondiscrimination policies and student organizations'
exclusionary rights. The polarization of these decisions, greatly
assisted by weaknesses in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,24 suggests that
this difficult expressive association question is in danger of being
improperly reduced to a simplistic referendum on LGBT rights. In
some quarters, appreciation for expressive association rights of student
groups is being rendered collateral damage in American culture wars.
This Article attempts to take new ground, in which protecting the
First Amendment association rights of even antihomosexual student
organizations is consistent with a deep commitment to improved
justice for sexual minorities.
Part II provides the doctrinal analysis that should be controlling.
First, although the fact that religion is both an identity and a belief
system complicates the question, courts should recognize that denying
only faith-based student groups the ability to constitute themselves
based on core belief is viewpoint discrimination. Second, a group
controlling its own message through exclusion of would-be
nonconforming members is engaged in the kind of conduct that
should receive full First Amendment protection. Third, the fact that
student groups are expressive associations within limited public
forums set up by schools and universities should not fatally
undermine the force of those groups' expressive association claims.
"Time Sensitive Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal." Corrective Order, Machen,
No. 08-13332-EE (11th Cir. Jul. 30, 2008) (granting appellants' motion).
22 The growing availability of same-sex marriage will have little impact on CLS
policies regarding homosexuality, as the CLS is unlikely to recognize the validity of
same-sex marriage. See, e.g., The Center for Law & Religious Freedom, The Advocacy
Ministry of the Christian Legal Society, The Center Blog: Same-Sex-Marriage,
http://religiousfreedom.blogspot.comsearch/abel/Same-Sex-Marriage (last visited
Nov. 30, 2008) (including blog postings commenting on how the evolving context
concerning same-sex marriage will not significantly affect CLS policies regarding
homosexuality).
23 E.g., Walker, 453 F.3d at 860; Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347, at *4.
24 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
[Vol. 42:889
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Finally, in this context, exclusion from membership on the basis of
belief (that homosexuality is good) and exclusion on the basis of
behavior (actively engaging in homosexuality) should be distinguished
from exclusion on the basis of status or identity (being homosexual).
Part III interrogates the equality claim at stake in enforcement of
nondiscrimination policies in these controversies, and finds it to be
weak. The principle of equality or nondiscrimination that insists on
the right of Democrats to join the Young Republicans, or homophobes
to join the Gay-Straight Alliance, or people who do not subscribe to
the CLS statement of purpose to join the CLS, is an overly formal,
inconsequential, empty version of equality. Many defenders of
nondiscrimination policies in these conflicts tend to overvalue the
equality right at stake because of its usefulness as a symbol of support
for LGBT people, but more meaningful and less costly symbols would
be preferable.
Part IV develops the claim that conceptualizing the viewpoint and
identity of the educational institution as distinct and separate from the
viewpoint and identity of the exclusionary student organization is
appropriate and necessary, and promotes three important collateral
First Amendment goals. First, separation-of-church-and-state values
are strengthened when public schools and universities distance their
own expressive identities from the expressive identities of faith-based
student groups permitted under current Establishment Clause
doctrine. Next, recognizing the conceptual distance between the
expressive identity of the institution and of the student group in this
context offers a better and more consistent defense against the
apparently growing pressure to require student speech to conform to
the educational institution's values or mission." Third, clearly
delineating the difference between the voice of the student
organization and the voice of the educational institution may help to
rehabilitate the expressive identity of the educational institution,
which the Court found hard to recognize in Rumsfeld v. FAIR."
Part V suggests several limiting principles and operational
guidelines for schools and universities when implementing
25 Brief of Petitioner at 20-25, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-
278), 2007 WL 118979; Reply Brief of Petitioners at 10, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No.
06-278), 2007 WL 747754; see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, High-Value Speech and the Basic
Educational Mission of a Public High School: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 111 (2008) (warning against limiting student speech based on
conformity to schools' educational mission).
26 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69-
70 (2006).
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exclusionary rights of student organizations. The Conclusion
reaffirms the strategic value to sexual minorities of principled
protection of free expression for all students, even those deeply
opposed to homosexuality. In sum, rather than focusing on limiting
the expressive rights of antigay student groups, schools and
universities should find more powerful ways to advance equality for
LGBT students.
I. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION AS BATTLEGROUND IN THE CULTURE
WARS
A. Resisting the Dale Invitation
The expressive association doctrine in Roberts,27 Rotary,28 and Dale29
requires balancing the strength of the state's interest in
nondiscrimination against the intrusive impact of forced inclusion on
the expressive association. This weighing almost inevitably invites
judgments on the relative importance of whatever principle of
nondiscrimination is at stake, whether based on religion, sexual
orientation, or something else. However, the cases addressing
religious student organizations' expressive association rights have
moved beyond this doctrinal balancing. They have instead become
markedly polarized battlegrounds in what Michael McConnell has
identified as a "seemingly irreconcilable clash" between the rights and
interests of sexual minorities and the beliefs of some religious
people.3 °  Antihomosexuality religious organizations are using
aggressive litigation strategies to assert exclusionary expressive
association rights.3' In reaction, and in the supercharged environment
of the culture wars, Justice Scalia's "kulturkampf,''32 progressive
people are undervaluing important free speech interests in their
attempts to signal and create real support for LGBT equality.
Willingness to fight the anti-homosexual religious groups has become
27 Roberts v. U.S.Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 610 (1984).
28 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 538 (1987).
29 Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
3 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 43-44 (2000).
31 The CLS, for example, has an aggressive and adamant litigation strategy to
enforce the exclusionary rights of CLS chapters across the country. See Christian
Legal Society Home Page, http://clsnet.org (last visited June 23, 2008).
32 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
898 [Vol. 42:889
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a sign of commitment to equality for LGBT students, obscuring the
First Amendment principles at stake.33
The United States Supreme Court bears a large share of the
responsibility for the polarization of these cases; the Court's treatment
of similar issues in Dale succumbed to precisely this dynamic. Under
Roberts and Rotary, expressive associations have First Amendment
rights to control their membership, but they can only trump
nondiscrimination policies if identity exclusion is at the heart of their
expressive purpose.34  Thus, for example, under well-established
analysis, the Ku Klux Klan could earn an exemption from prohibitions
on race discrimination, because racism and hostility to people of color
are central to its expressive identity.35
In light of the strength of the state's statutory interest in enforcing
equality for sexual minorities, to prevail in Dale the Boy Scouts should
have had to establish that an antihomosexual message was central to
their expressive identity.36 Instead of a serious examination of the
expressive association interests at stake, however, the Court permitted
the Boy Scouts to use the intensity of their desire to kick out James Dale
as a proxy for ideological commitment. Dale wrongfully undervalued
the state's interest in nondiscrimination and inflated the Scouts'
antihomosexual message, essentially giving the Scouts a free pass.
Dale also blurred the distinction between identity and ideology in
unhelpful ways. Dale makes it harder to see the principle that
expressive associations should be able to organize themselves on the
basis of belief, because Dale issued a loose invitation to use identity-
based exclusion (no homosexuals allowed) as a proxy for belief (we
33 For example, the ACLU and the ACLU of Northern California entered the
litigation between the CLS and Hastings College of Law as amicus curiae in support of
Hastings, with analysis that properly recognized the very strong interest in
nondiscrimination protection for LGBT students. See Brief for Am. Civil Liberties
Union and Am. Civil Liberties Union of N. Cal. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Hastings at 3-4, Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484JSW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17,
2006), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347. Surprisingly, however, for civil liberties
organizations, this analysis found that no cognizable associational interest of the CLS
was implicated. See id.
14 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 538 (1987);
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
" In theory, under the logic of Rotary and Roberts, a student organization created
precisely to advocate for exclusion or separation based on race, may have a First
Amendment claim to discriminate on that basis in membership and leadership criteria.
See Duarte, 481 U.S. at 538; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19.
36 For a particularly effective discussion of this point, see Erwin Chemerinsky &
Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595,
604-12 (2001).
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oppose homosexuality). Nowhere in Dale is there any evidence that
the Boy Scouts remove heterosexuals who advocate in favor of
homosexuality.37 In other words, the Boy Scouts and the Court
blurred any distinction between the ideological position of being anti-
homosexuality, and the exclusion of homosexuals. Dale permitted the
Boy Scouts to create an ideological position through discrimination.
The Court allowed the Scouts' desire to discriminate to substitute for
any established organizational antigay message or ideology that had
predated litigation. This reduced the analysis to a referendum on
equality for sexual minorities, in which equality mattered little. No
wonder LGBT groups and civil liberties organizations are approaching
the exclusionary student organization controversies with a passion to
right the balance and restore LGBT nondiscrimination values.
Unfortunately, this passion comes at the expense of expressive
associational values.38
B. Hsu and Truth: The High School Cases
The Second and Ninth Circuits have adopted very different approaches
to the exclusionary rights of high school religious groups. The Second
Circuit decision, Hsu,39 concerned a proposed high school student club
called "Walking on Water." The purpose of the club was Christian
fellowship, including singing, prayer, discussion, study, and guest
speakers, with an overarching goal of gathering "to praise God."4 As
originally proposed, the club would have restricted membership to
Christians, but after negotiations with the school authorities, the
students opted for the more limited requirement that officers "accept...
Jesus Christ as savior."'" This proposed leadership requirement violated
the school board's nondiscrimination policy, which provided that the
37 For an excellent discussion of this point, see Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the
Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1591, 1602 (2001).
38 A similar dynamic has led to an unfortunate lack of sensitivity to speech rights
of antigay students. See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th
Cir. 2006), vacating as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007) (finding, in original opinion, no
constitutional protection for antigay student speech); Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch.
Dist. # 204, No. 07 C 1586, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94411 (N.D. II. Dec. 21, 2007)
(evaluating First Amendment protection for "Be Happy, Not Gay" t-shirt that
conflicted with high school tolerance policy); Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Sch., 293 F.
Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (upholding Christian student's right to express in
"What Diversity Means to Me" program that she could not accept religious or sexual
orientation diversity).
39 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996).
40 Id. at 849.
41 Id. at 849-50.
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school board would not discriminate "'on the basis of race, color,
national origin, creed or religion, marital status, sex, age or handicapping
condition' in providing 'access to ... student activities.' 42
Following Hurley v. Irish American GLIB Ass'n43 and Roberts by
analogy, the Hsu court recognized that the right of association
includes a right not to associate, 4 and that the initiating students'
desire to control the leadership implicated expressive association
rights. The court correctly noted that having leadership consistent
with the specific goals of the club serves the purpose of any club:
"The Club's leadership eligibility requirement on the basis of religion
is therefore similar to a chess club's eligibility requirement based on
chess. . . ." "[MIany extracurricular clubs typically define
themselves . . . by requiring that their leaders show a firm
commitment to the club's cause."46
The Hsu court properly grounded its analysis in the required nexus
between the group's purpose for existence and its desired exclusionary
principles, noting that a "hypothetical chess club that excluded
Muslims could not claim that the exclusion was necessary to
guarantee committed chess players."47 The court determined that the
42 Id. at 850. A second provision guaranteed that no student would be excluded
on those enumerated grounds from "extracurricular activities." Id.
43 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (upholding First Amendment right of parade organizers to
exclude gay Irish contingent).
44 See Hsu, 85 F.3d at 858 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
45 Id. at 860.
46 Id. The court continued:
[I]t would be sensible - and unremarkable in light of the clubs' particular
purposes - for the Students Protecting the Environment Against
Contamination Club to require that officers have a demonstrated
commitment to conservation or recycling; for Students Against Drunk
Driving to require that officers have taken the pledge; or for Students for
Social Responsibility to require that officers have a social conscience.
Similarly, a hypothetical school scouting club could preserve its character
and values by requiring that officers be exemplars of the scouting
movement, just as a hypothetical Marxist discussion group could require
that officers be dedicated to socialist values or be card-carriers.
Id.
47 Id. at 861 n.20. As Alan Brownstein noted at this symposium, a situation of a
group based on avocation and exclusion, such as a Muslim Chess Club, is a more
difficult question. In a public forum a Muslim Chess Club should be permitted to
exclude those who do not fit both aspects of their core expressive identity. However,
educational institutions faced with such a student group can institute policies to limit
the institutional impact of such a group's discrimination. See infra text accompanying
notes 165-82.
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exclusion must serve a "legitimate self-definitional goal for the group.
This essential and direct link between the legitimate purpose of the
club and the principle of exclusion necessary to achieve that purpose
distinguishes the girls' soccer team and the Walking on Water Club
from the hypothetical Chess Club."48
In Hsu, the Second Circuit recognized that the club's Christian officer
requirement, as applied to the President, Vice-President, and Music
Coordinator, is "essential to the expressive content of the meetings and
to the group's preservation of its purpose and identity, and is thus
protected by the Equal Access Act."49 The court described Hurley as
"instructive," finding that the Christian identity of the leaders of the
student group implicated the group's "speech" similarly to the way that
inclusion of the group marching with a gay rights banner would
impermissibly alter the Hurley parade organizers' "message. 50
The Hsu majority's main error was to parse too tightly the notion of
which activities were "religious." The court found that "to the extent
that such a group engages in social and community activities that are
not integral to a sectarian religious experience, it is in danger of
becoming merely a religious affinity group practicing social
exclusion."'" In this vein, the court distinguished the more clearly
worship-related speech activities at the meetings from the picnics and
community service activities that the club had also proposed.
Rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that the Activities Coordinator
would need to ensure that these activities did not offend "Christian
sensibilities," the court declared that "an agnostic with an
understanding of 'Christian sensibilities' might plan these activities as
48 Hsu, 85 F.3d at 861 n.20.
4 Id. at 848. The Equal Access Act prohibits public secondary schools that
receive federal funding and that create a limited public forum for student
organizations from denying equal access to students who want to conduct meetings
based on the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at the
meetings. Under the statute, a school has a "limited open forum" if it "grants an
offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to
meet on school premises during noninstructional time." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)-(b)
(1984). According to the Hsu decision, there is no legislative history on the
application of the Equal Access Act to exclusionary membership policies. Hsu, 85
F.3d at 854-55. The court also concluded that "Itihis application of the Act is
constitutional because the school's recognition of the club will not draw the school
into an establishment of religion or impair the school's efforts to prevent invidious
discrimination." Id. at 848.
5 Hsu, 85 F.3d at 856-57. The Hsu court recognized that the "religious speech" of
the club would be "in the nature of religious devotions." Id.
51 id.
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well as any other student."52 Thus, the court determined that the
group's Activities Coordinator and Secretary no more needed to be
Christian than anyone who attended the meetings, and that "a
religious test for membership or attendance ... [would be] plainly
insupportable."53
The court concluded, "[iit is difficult to understand how allowing
non-Christians to attend the meetings and sing (or listen to) Christian
prayers would change the Club's speech."54  The Hsu majority
overstepped by imagining that it could decide that the leadership of
the Music Coordinator, for example, or the Secretary, need not be
imbued with Christian faith. Secularizing the aspects of Christian
fellowship that are furthest from traditional worship rituals may
simply deliver a parched version of the Christian faith.55
Nonetheless, the Hsu court properly found that treating the religious
group equally with the secular groups, as required by the Equal Access
Act, required recognizing that religion is a belief or ideology, in
addition to being a status. "[Jiust as a secular club may protect its
character by restricting eligibility for leadership to those who show
52 Id. "Similarly, it is very difficult to understand why the 'religious speech' at the
Walking on Water Club meetings would be affected by having a non-Christian
'Secretary,' whose principal duties are 'to accurately record the minutes of meetings
and be involved in the Club's financial accounting and reporting."' Id.
53 Id. at 858. The court erred in combining as if identical the constitutional questions
related to membership and attendance. In conjunction with ordinary procedures for
conducting a group's business, mere attendance of nonbelievers holds little risk of
misshaping the beliefs at the core of the group's identity. Membership, however, brings
opportunities to shape the organization, which means that First Amendment expressive
association values are implicated. In his concurrence and dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland
also suggested that the Walking on Water Club may be able to limit its membership to
Christians. Id. at 873 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing N.Y. State
Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)).
14 Id. at 858 n.17 (majority opinion). By this analysis, the Second Circuit
separated the Activities Coordinator and the Secretary, who the court found did not
need to be Christian, from the President, Vice-President, and Music Coordinator, who,
by contrast, would ensure that the meetings would be "imbued with certain qualities
of commitment and spirituality" to "make a certain kind of speech possible" and
"affect the 'religious ... content of the speech at [the] meetings,' within the meaning
of the Equal Access Act." Id. at 858 (footnote omitted).
55 In his concurrence and dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland argued that because "the
Club members are better qualified than are we to determine the duties and necessary
qualities of all their leaders," the Walking on Water Club should be permitted to
impose the requirement of being Christian on all of its officers. Id. at 874 (Van
Graafeiland, J., concurring and dissenting); cf. FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES 83 (2007) (noting that when
government funding comes with strings attached, religious values of religious entities
may be compromised).
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themselves committed to the cause, the [plaintiffs] may protect their
ability to hold Christian Bible meetings by including the leadership
provision in the club's constitution."56  The court found that the
plaintiffs' concern that "students inimical to the Club's purpose" could
take over the club was speculative, but "by no means unreasonable. '57
Three additional weaknesses mar the Hsu majority opinion. First,
the court attempted a too-easy distinction between a religious group's
desire to exclude based on religious ideology and "excluding others
out of bias. '58  Bigoted faiths exist. Second, the court asserted
somewhat facilely that genuine religious grounds for exclusion will
not stigmatize those excluded.59  The actual interplay between
religious conviction, bias, and the stigma of exclusion is more
complex. Although exclusion based on religious non-belief may not
always carry the same stigma as exclusion on grounds of hatred or
racism, it can be quite severe.6" Exclusion from religious community
may carry with it the threat of eternal damnation, for example.
Especially in the context of children and youth, exclusion for any
56 Hsu, 85 F.3d at 861.
57 Id. The Hsu court also suggested that the Equal Protection Clause would
prevent clubs from discriminating against racial minorities, see id. at 867, that Tinker
offers a strong tool for school officials to maintain good educational order, see id., and
that the congressional history of the Equal Access Act shows that it was not intended
to protect "cults and hate groups." Id. at 867-68. The distinction between a protected
religion and a nonprotected "cult" is suspect under First Amendment principles.
58 Id. at 871.
Id. Regarding the Equal Protection issue, the Hsu court found that
[n]othing in the record of the School's arguments suggest that the Walking
on Water Club insists on Christian leaders because of animus against people
of other religions. Since the Club exists solely to engage in Christian "praise
of God," non-Christians suffer no articulable disadvantage by being unable
to lead the Club's prayers and devotions. Nor is there any indication that
the exclusion of non-Christians from Club leadership will subordinate or
stigmatize them. Were any of these facts otherwise, the School might be
justified in refusing an exemption from its nondiscrimination policy.
Id. at 869 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983)).
60 FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER & DISCRIMINATION: THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES & DISSENTERS 8-18 (1999) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992); Illinois v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132
F.3d 542 (10th Cir. 1997); Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391
(10th Cir. 1985); Religious Liberty: Hearings Before the S. judiciary Comm., 104th
Cong. 1 (1995) (prepared testimony of Reverend James Forbes) (describing how
students may be traumatized for not aligning with religious majority in public school);
Complaint of Herring, Herring v. Key, (M.D. Ala. 1997); 60 Minutes, Profile: Lisa
Herdahl v. Pontotoc County: Mother Sues Public School over Prayer (television
broadcastJune 16, 1996)).
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reason may cause some stigma or hurt. Third, the court found that
"[i] t is undisputed that the decision by the Walking on Water Club to
impose a religious test for leadership positions has been made purely
for expressive purposes - to guarantee that meetings include the
desired worship and observance - rather than for the sake of
exclusion itself."6' What is exclusion for the sake of exclusion? Is
there ever exclusion without a purpose?
The Hsu court presented what it declared to be a narrow holding:
[W] hen a sectarian religious club discriminates on the basis of
religion for the purpose of assuring the sectarian religious
character of its meetings, a school must allow it to do so
unless that club's specific form of discrimination would be
invidious (and would thereby violate the equal protection
rights of other students), or would otherwise disrupt or impair
the school's educational mission.62
Although wrapped in qualifications, the central theme of Hsu is
appropriately protective of discriminatory expressive associations in
high schools.
The Ninth Circuit recently decided a similar set of issues very
differently in Truth.63 Like Hsu, Truth concerns a proposed Christian
high school student group, in this case named "Truth," which wanted
61 Hsu, 85 F.3d at 859. Revealing a perhaps naive distinction between
discriminatory motives and sound ones, the court declared that "an exclusion solely
for reasons of hostility or cliquishness, with no direct bearing or effect on the group's
speech, does not implicate the right to expressive association." Id.
62 Id. at 872-73.
63 In its first decision in Truth, 499 F.3d 999, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth
Circuit panel (Judges Wallace, Wardlaw, and Fisher) resoundingly affirmed the
summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the school district and other
defendants. Following a petition for rehearing en banc, on April 25, 2008, the same
panel withdrew the original opinion and replaced it with a decision that retained
much of the earlier analysis, but reversed and remanded on the narrow question
whether the plaintiffs could prove their allegation that the school district had
impermissibly discriminated against religious groups by selectively enforcing its
nondiscrimination policies. 524 F.3d 957, 960-64 (9th Cir. 2008). On September 9,
2008, the decision was amended to add a concurrence joined by Judges Fisher and
Wardlaw. Truth I1, 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fisher, J., concurring). Appellant's
Petition for Rehearing En Banc was denied November 17, 2008. Order Denying
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Truth v. Kent Sch.
Dist., No. 04-35876 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2008), 2008 WL 5273928. The Order denying
rehearing en banc included an opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing filed by
Judge Bea, joined by Judge O'Scannlain, id. at 1-2 (Bea, J., dissenting), and an opinion
concurring in the denial of rehearing filed by Judges Wardlaw and Fisher, id. at 1
(Wardlaw, J., concurring).
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to limit its members and leaders to Christians. As in Hsu, the student
group attempted several times to gain recognition before litigating, in
this case, on the basis of its third proposed charter. That third charter
would have required any member or officer to sign a "statement of
faith."'  The school district denied Truth's application as inconsistent
with district policies and state statutes prohibiting discrimination
based on creed or sexual orientation, among other identity categories.
Although technically reconcilable with Hsu,6 5 the sensibilities and tone
of the Truth decision are markedly different.
In assessing the Equal Access Act claim, the Ninth Circuit in Truth
found that the club's "requirement that members possess a 'true desire
to ... grow in a relationship with Jesus Christ' inherently excludes
non-Christians."66 Instead of recognizing that the exclusion Truth
sought would be based on both religious identity and on religious
belief, the court saw only identity: "The [School] District denied
Truth [recognized] status, at least in part, based on its discriminatory
membership criteria, not the religious 'content of the speech."'67
Incorrectly,6" the Ninth Circuit panel in Truth found that the
nondiscrimination policy was content neutral, like a time, place, and
manner limitation.6 9 Also incorrectly,7" the Ninth Circuit suggested
that Truth's goal of controlling its membership based on faith would
constitute unprotected conduct, not speech.71 In other words, the
Second Circuit in Hsu was divided in how far to extend the
exclusionary rights of the Christian student club Walking on Water,
6 Truth II, 542 F.3d at 639.
65 The Truth court decided only the issue of Truth's proposed membership
requirements, which it rejected, whereas the Hsu court addressed leadership positions,
and in dicta dismissed any right to restrict membership based on Christian faith. See
id. at 647 (distinguishing Hsu).
Id. at 968; Truth 1, 499 F.3d at 1009 (same language in original opinion).
67 Truth II, 542 F.3d at 645. In its first opinion, the panel wrote that "[tihe
District has denied Truth [Associated Student Body] status not because of the
religious 'content of the speech,' but rather because of its discriminatory membership
criteria." Truth 1, 499 F.3d at 1009.
68 See infra text accompanying notes 105-13.
69 Truth II, 542 F.3d at 647; Truth 1, 499 F.3d at 1010. To the contrary, the Second
Circuit in Hsu determined that equal treatment for the faith-based group required that it
be permitted to control leadership on the basis of conformity to its purpose. Hsu v.
Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1996).
70 See infra text accompanying notes 114-23.
71 Truth II, 542 F.3d at 647 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006)).
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but the Ninth Circuit panel rejected any basis for the Christian group
Truth to exclude non-Christians.
In the third and most recent version of the decision, two members of
the Truth panel added a concurrence to amplify the First Amendment
expressive association analysis and soundly reject Truth's First
Amendment argument.1 2 Comparing expressive association rights in a
limited public forum to more robust direct speech rights, the concurrence
rejected Truth's First Amendment claim on grounds that the school
district's policy was "viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum."73 As discussed below,74 in a limited public
forum created to allow students to form groups on the basis of shared
beliefs, preventing faith-based groups from using their beliefs to organize
a group should not be dismissed as viewpoint neutrality.
C. Walker and Kane: The Law School Cases
In Walker,75 the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court's denial of a
preliminary injunction requiring the law school at Southern Illinois
University to recognize the CLS as a student group. The law school
had denied the CLS recognition because it violated the school's
nondiscrimination policies by excluding students who engage in
unrepentant homosexual conduct. The CLS policy sits right in the
muddled intersection of conduct and status: "CLS welcomes anyone
to its meetings, but voting members and officers of the organization
must subscribe to the statement of faith, meaning, among other things,
that they must not engage in or approve of fornication, adultery, or
homosexual conduct; or having done so, must repent of that
conduct. '76 The CLS told the law school that "a person 'who may have
engaged in homosexual conduct in the past but has repented of that
conduct, or who has homosexual inclinations but does not engage in
or affirm homosexual conduct, would not be prevented from serving
as an officer or member."'77  The Walker majority parsed the
distinction between conduct and status and found no violation of the
law school's policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation because "CLS requires its members and officers to adhere
72 Truth II , 542 F.3d at 651 (Fisher, J., concurring). Judge Fisher wrote the
concurrence, which Judge Wardlaw joined. Id.
73 Id. at 651.
" See infra text accompanying notes 105-13.
75 453 F.3d 853, 867 (2006).
76 Id. at 858.
77 Id.
20091
HeinOnline -- 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 907 2008-2009
University of California, Davis
to and conduct themselves in accordance with a belief system
regarding standards of sexual conduct, but its membership
requirements do not exclude members on the basis of sexual
orientation. "78
The Walker court based its analysis in large part on the conceptual
separation of the CLS chapter's expressive identity from that of the law
school. Correctly, 79 the court explained that:
there is no support in the record for the proposition that CLS
is an extension of SIU. CLS is a private speaker, albeit one
receiving (until it was derecognized) the public benefits
associated with recognized student organization status. But
subsidized student organizations at public universities are
engaged in private speech, not spreading state-endorsed
messages. 8°
Unfortunately, the Walker majority opinion is blind to the equality
values at stake from the perspective of the law school. Not even
acknowledging the nondiscrimination interest, the Walker majority
asked, "[wihat interest does SIU have in forcing CLS to accept
members whose activities violate its creed other than eradicating or
neutralizing particular beliefs contained in that creed? SIU has
identified none."'"
Judge Harlington Wood dissented in Walker, showing skepticism
toward the CLS as complete as the majority's toward the law school.
Judge Wood found that student organizations constitute educational
opportunities within the meaning of the nondiscrimination policy. He
also rejected the majority's distinction between discrimination based
on sexual orientation and discrimination based on sexual conduct,
finding no evidence that the CLS actually applied its membership
policy as it alleged.82 Judge Wood used Lawrence v. Texas to assert
11 Id. at 860. Noting that the policy also prevents unrepentant heterosexual
adulterers from becoming members, the court accepted the CL.S's argument that no
one who engages in sexual relations outside of traditional marriage is eligible for
membership or leadership. See id.
79 See infra text accompanying notes 145-64.
o Walker, 453 F.3d at 861 (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)). The Walker majority also argued that the Affirmative
Action/Equal Employment Opportunity policy probably did not apply because
membership in the CLS did not constitute an "education opportunity." Id. at 860-61.
"I Id. at 863.
82 Id. at 873 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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that the university would be entitled to ban discrimination based on
either orientation or conduct."3
Reminiscent of Dale, Judge Wood's treatment of the CLS statement
of faith (prohibiting all non-repentant sex outside of marriage)
improperly conflates status and ideology. Judge Wood argued that the
CLS statement of faith violated the law school's nondiscrimination
policy because "CLS would prevent a person who openly affirmed his
or her right to engage in homosexual conduct, as part of an intimate
relationship with another person, from serving as an officer or
member of the organization. "84 In other words, Judge Wood equated
exclusion of people who refuse to denounce their homosexuality with
discrimination based on homosexuality. This is the flip side of the
error perpetuated in Dale, in which the court permitted the Boy Scouts
to equate the status of homosexuality with the ideology of being in
favor of homosexuality.85 Sexual orientation status, behavior, and
ideology overlaps are inevitably challenging, with precious few bright
lines of distinction, but we should recognize that one's attitude about
one's own homosexuality, whether pride or self-denunciation,
constitutes an ideology or belief that is separate from the sexual
orientation status itself. The Dale court wrongly conflated the two to
justify the Boy Scouts' policy of discrimination, and Judge Wood
wrongly conflated the two to invalidate the CLS policy of exclusion
based on behavior and attitude.8 6 In short, the Walker majority
applauded the CLS and dismissed the law school at every step, and the
dissent came close to doing the opposite.
The polarization revealed in these opinions escalates with Kane,87
the district court opinion in the Hastings College of Law case that
shares the same sympathies as the Walker dissent. Indeed, the Kane
statement of the issue broadcasts what the result will be:
83 Id.
84 Id. at 868-70. On this issue, Judge Wood bemoaned the lack of a record and
suggested that a hearing would be needed to examine such questions as whether the
CLS policy had been applied to heterosexual students who had engaged in sexual
activities outside of marriage, or whether the CLS had admitted any non-sexually
active gays. Id. at 869.
85 See supra text accompanying note 37.
86 Judge Wood pointed out that the CLS chapter constitution contains a
nondiscrimination policy that conspicuously omits "sexual orientation" as a basis for
protection, which he read as further evidence that the CLS policy was, indeed, a policy
of discrimination based on status. Walker, 453 F.3d at 868 (Wood, J., dissenting).
87 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484JSW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27347, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2006).
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This case concerns whether a religious student organization
may compel a public university law school to fund its activities
and to allow the group to use the school's name and facilities
even though the organization admittedly discriminates in the
selection of its members and officers on the basis of religion
and sexual orientation.88
This is noteworthy in part because the CLS chapter denies that it
discriminates based on sexual orientation status; Hastings claims that
the CLS does.89
The district court in Kane first determined that the
nondiscrimination policy targets conduct, not speech:
Akin to Hurley, Roberts, [Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987)], and Evans, the Court finds
that on its face, Hastings'[s] Nondiscrimination Policy targets
conduct, i.e. discrimination, not speech. As in Rumsfeld, the
Court finds that the Nondiscrimination Policy regulates
conduct, not speech because it affects what CLS must do if it
wants to become a registered student organization - not
engage in discrimination - not what CLS may or may not say
regarding its beliefs on non-orthodox Christianity or
homosexuality.90
The Kane court continued, "In contrast to Hurley, CLS is not
excluding certain students who wish to make a particular statement,
but rather, CLS is excluding all students who are lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or not orthodox Christian."91 The court rejected the CLS's
distinction between exclusions based on behavior and attitude rather
than status:
Although CLS argues that it does not discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation, but merely excludes students who engage
in or advocate homosexual conduct, this is a distinction without
a difference. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting attempt to distinguish
statute discriminating against "homosexual conduct" from one
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation: "While it is
Id.
9 Brief of Appellee at 11, Kane, No. C 04-04484JSW.
90 Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347, at *23-24. Contrary to the court's analysis,
the First Amendment protects a great deal that is "done" for expressive purposes, in
addition to what is "said." See infra text accompanying notes 114-23.
"' Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227347, at *24.
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true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted
by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being
homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the State] sodomy
law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed
toward gay persons as a class.")9 2
The Kane court's analogy between the CLS statement of faith and
the Texas anti-sodomy statute invalidated in Lawrence would be
stronger if the CLS creed targeted only homosexual activity. Even so,
the analogy fails to account for any First Amendment interests at stake
in the expressive association context. Here, the CLS asserts that it
seeks to exclude from membership all those who endorse homosexual
conduct. Assuming the factual truth of these assertions - the CLS is
excluding everyone, gay or straight, who approves of homosexuality,
not just gay people - that is an ideology or belief that receives
expressive association protection. Dale's lack of precision between
identity and belief invited this error, in the opposite direction, by
using James Dale's identity as a too-easy proxy for endorsement of
homosexuality.
The Kane court next addressed the history of the CLS chapter at
Hastings, noting that Hastings never interfered with the chapter's
existence until it refused to sign the nondiscrimination policy.93 The
record even reflects that, in its prior iteration, the group included one
open lesbian.9 From this evidence the court concluded, "[a]s long as
the organization admitted all students who wanted to join, it was free
to express any ideas or viewpoints. It was not until CLS refused to
comply with the Nondiscrimination Policy that Hastings withheld
recognition." 95 But, to those who recognize the particular version of
Christian morality espoused by the CLS as a protected belief, this
history suggests two more troubling possibilities: first, that the group
changed its defining beliefs; and second, that the public law school
prefers the more inclusive Christianity of the earlier organization.
Turning to direct free speech analysis and the public forum
question, the Kane court found that Hastings's policy is viewpoint
neutral.96 The district court genuinely did not see any infringement
92 Id. at *24 n.2 (some citations omitted).
93 Id. at *24-25.
94 Id. at *73.
95 Id.
96 The court expounded:
CLS contends that Hastings engages in viewpoint discrimination because it
prohibits CLS from using religion as a criteria for selecting members and
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on the CLS's message or identity from forcing it to include people who
endorsed sexual conduct outside of marriage: "Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that Hastings'[s] condition for participation could
be viewed as requiring CLS to admit gay, lesbian, and non-Christian
students, CLS has not demonstrated that its ability to express its views
would be significantly impaired by complying with such a
requirement." 97
The Kane court distinguished Dale in part because Dale was himself
a leader advocating for gay rights:
The broad class of students CLS seeks to exclude significantly
differs from the Boy Scouts' conduct in Dale. CLS does not
confine its desired discrimination to students who are open
and honest about being gay, lesbian, or non-orthodox
Christian, let alone leaders on campus advocating for gay
rights or non-Christian faiths. Rather, CLS seeks to exclude
all lesbian, gay, bisexual or non-orthodox Christian students.
See [Boy Scouts of Am. v.] Dale, [530 U.S. 640,1 653 [(2000)]
(finding that because Dale was open and honest about his
sexual orientation and was a gay rights activist, his presence
would force the Boy Scouts to send a message to its youth
members and the world regarding homosexuality).98
In this way, the Kane court dismissed the idea that abiding by the
nondiscrimination policy would have any adverse impact on the CLS's
ability to remain true to its statement of faith.99
officers. CLS is confusing the appropriate analysis by focusing on the reasons
CLS is acting, as opposed to the reasons underlying Hastings'[s]
Nondiscrimination Policy. CLS also asserts that, as a religious group, it is
unfairly disadvantaged. It argues that while other organizations, such as sports
teams or political groups, may exclude students based on their athletic ability
or political beliefs, CLS may not exclude the students of its choice. Again, CLS
is confusing the analysis by focusing on the effect and the reason CLS is acting,
as opposed to the reasons underlying Hastings'[s] conduct.
Id. at *40-41 (citations omitted).
97 Id. at *67.
98 Id. at *69-70 (some citations omitted).
99 The court wondered, "[1lt is not clear how anyone at Hastings, other than the
individual members and officers, would even be aware that CLS's members and officers
are living their private lives in accordance with a certain code of conduct." Id. at *72.
Yet, there is no indication that the participation of such students made the
organization any less Christian or hampered the organization's ability to
express any particular message or belief. Nor is there any evidence that
during those ten years students hostile to CLS's beliefs tried to overtake the
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The polarization in these decisions is striking. Dale's dismissiveness
toward the state's goal of equality for sexual minorities gave expressive
association a bad name and made addressing these issues in a
principled way much more difficult. Progressives' backlash reaction,
urging the importance of equality for sexual minorities by minimizing
the value of associational interests, is understandable but incorrect.
Rather than erasing the central value of the expressive associational
interests, the better analysis rehabilitates them along with the true
equality interests at stake. That is the project of this Article.
11. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR EXCLUSIONARY STUDENT
GROUPS
Public schools or universities may sponsor faith-based student
organizations within the context of limited public forums of expressive
associations.100 Attracting members based on ideology or belief is
inherent in the concept of a public forum of expressive associations,
including those of student groups. Therefore, the better limited public
forum analysis protects the group's exclusionary right when it is closely
tied to the central purpose and identity of the student organization. The
strongest doctrinal treatment rests on four fundamental points. First,
forcing student organizations to abandon core membership criteria to
conform to nondiscrimination policies is impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.1"' Second, limiting group membership to those who
share the group's founding belief or ideology is expressive activity fully
protected by the First Amendment, not unprotected conduct. 102 Third,
the fact that the public school or university provides material or
symbolic support to student organizations within the school's limited
public forum does not diminish the First Amendment protection within
that forum.0 3  Finally, distinguishing between status, belief, and
behavior is often necessary."
organization or alter its views.
Id. at *73; cf. Shiffrin, supra note 12 (emphasizing internal meaning of ideology, rather
than outward-directed message).
100 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995).
'0' See infra text accompanying notes 105-13.
102 See infra text accompanying notes 114-23.
103 See infra text accompanying notes 124-34.
104 See infra text accompanying notes 135-38.
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A. Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Policies Is Viewpoint
Discrimination when It Forces Student Groups to Abandon Core
Membership Criteria
A public forum exists to create a diversity of perspectives and
viewpoints. Expressive associations, by definition, are organized
around particular perspectives or viewpoints. In Roberts, for example,
the Court recognized that "[tihere can be no clearer example of an
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire."'1 5 Freedom to associate "plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate." 106 Thus, student organizations need ideological protection
for membership and leadership.
To create a public forum that includes organizations whose
organizing principle is religious belief and yet not permit those
organizations to make distinctions based on that faith is almost
incoherent. In other words, religion is an ideology (in addition to
being an identity category), and preventing only religious
organizations from constituting themselves based on their ideology is
not neutral. 10 7 When viewed from the perspective of the faith-based
organization, it is being subjected to a viewpoint-based limitation
when it is forbidden from establishing itself on the basis of belief
because its belief is religious.'0 8
Many who insist on enforcing nondiscrimination policies see
religion as identity or status; many who assert the right of a religious
group to control its membership based on faith view religion as a
belief system. A religion is both and much more. Therefore,
characterizing religion as either an identity or a belief does not answer
the question of how to apply nondiscrimination policies to religious
groups. Enforcement of nondiscrimination policies against religious
student groups can be understood to be enforcement of a neutral
policy, and, just as logically, to be viewpoint discrimination that
singles out only religious groups. The better argument, however, is
that denying only faith-based student groups the ability to require
105 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
106 Id.; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
107 Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861-62
(1995) (denying funding of religious newspaper on Establishment Clause grounds in
public forum constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
i's See William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U.
L. REV. 68, 78-80, 90-91 (1986) (arguing that rather than allowing liberty and equality
to compete at abstract levels, nondiscrimination should trump unless it would destroy
viability of association).
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conformity with core beliefs is viewpoint discrimination. Otherwise,
the application of the nondiscrimination policy against faith-based
groups undermines the very purpose of the nondiscrimination policy:
protecting religious freedom. Protection of expressive association
requires that discrimination based on belief be recognized and
controlling, even when it also constitutes discrimination based on
one's religious identity.
The Second Circuit in Hsu nicely recognized that "equal access"
under the Equal Access Act does not mean uniformity. To the
contrary, Hsu suggested that a "no hat" rule could deny Jewish
students equal access for after-school religious purposes and a "shoes
required" rule could compromise a yoga club:
The neutral application of the School's rules allows the School
to say that it is treating all clubs equally. But exemptions from
neutrally applicable rules that impede one or another club
from expressing the beliefs that it was formed to express, may
be required if a school is to provide "equal access."' 9
Although the Hsu court was interpreting the Equal Access Act, the same
understanding of contextualized, substantive equality should inform the
concept of neutrality that is central in First Amendment analysis.
In rejecting the Southern Illinois University's position, the Walker
majority described the law school's nondiscrimination policy as
"viewpoint neutral on its face," 110 but suggested that there might be
evidence that the policy had not been applied in a viewpoint neutral
way. Specifically, the CLS alleged that the law school permitted other
student groups to violate the nondiscrimination policy, such as by
allowing the Muslim Student Association to limit membership to
Muslims, and the Adventist Campus Ministries to limit itself to those
"'professing the Seventh Day Adventist Faith."""'
Conversely, in rejecting the student group's First Amendment claim,
the Ninth Circuit concurrence in Truth emphasized that the school
district set up only a limited public forum, and declared without
analysis that the school district's restrictions based on its
nondiscrimination policy were "'viewpoint neutral and reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum.""' 2  Similarly and
"O Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 860 (2d Cir. 1996).
"0 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2006).
... Id. Similarly, Truth II reversed and remanded for a determination whether the
school district that denied recognition to the student group Truth had selectively
enforced its nondiscrimination policies. Truth II, 542 F.3d 634, 648 (2006).
112 Truth II, 542 F.3d at 651-52 (Fisher, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberger, 515
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unsurprisingly, as described above, the Kane court found the
Hastings's nondiscrimination policy to be viewpoint neutral, even as
applied, although the CLS pointed to the rules of other student
organizations that limited membership based on interest or purpose. 1 3
A deeper analysis leads to a conclusion contrary to the Truth and
Kane courts' holdings. To summarize, courts and advocates cannot
depend on decontextualized logic to determine the viewpoint
discrimination issue, but rather must look at why religion is a
protected category in nondiscrimination policies. Religion as identity
is included along with other protected identities in nondiscrimination
policies to protect religious faith. But that protected status effectively
singles out religion as belief for uniquely unfavorable treatment when
all non-faith-based beliefs (for example, vegetarianism, or advocacy for
school spirit) are protected through club memberships, but faith-based
groups are not. Therefore, courts should recognize that preventing
only faith-based groups from using membership criteria to protect
their expressive purposes is viewpoint discrimination.
B. Controlling One's Message Is Expressive Activity Protected by the
First Amendment
The ACLU and school districts that prefer nondiscrimination policies
to trump the expressive associational right of student organizations to
control their groups' messages argue that discrimination is conduct, not
speech." 4 However, under United States v. O'Brien," 5 controlling the
ideological message of an expressive association is the very kind of
conduct that requires First Amendment protection, because the
governmental interest in preventing this control is directly related to the
suppression of free expression." 6 On this issue, too, the Walker, Truth,
U.S. at 829).
113 See supra note 96.
... E.g., Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hastings
College at 3, 18 n.8, Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW.
115 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
116 O'Brien set forth the test for First Amendment protection for conduct:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377. But see Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 36, at 595, 601 (evaluating
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and Kane opinions talk past each other. Each places the group's
discriminatory control of message into either the conduct or the speech
category, depending on whether the court sees the discrimination or the
control of message.
The Sixth Circuit Walker majority recognized the significant impact
that enforcement of the nondiscrimination policy would have on the
CLS message. The court explained, "[olur next question is whether
application of SIU's antidiscrimination policy to force inclusion of
those who engage in or affirm homosexual conduct would
significantly affect CLS's ability to express its disapproval of
homosexual activity. To ask this question is very nearly to answer
it."' 17 The court continued, "[there can be little doubt that requiring
CLS to make this change would impair its ability to express
disapproval of active homosexuality."' 18
The Ninth Circuit decision in Truth, however, rested in large part on
the finding that the Christian high school group's desire to limit its
membership to Christians constituted unprotected conduct. The
Ninth Circuit drew from Healy v. James" 9 that the "Court did not
condemn incidental infringements on the students' associational
rights, so long as the school's reason for denying official recognition
was 'directed at the organization's activities, rather than its
philosophy."' 20  Following Healy in calling for application of the
O'Brien test, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the expressive issues:
discrimination as unprotected conduct under O'Brien).
117 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2006).
11 Id. at 863. The Walker court elaborated:
CLS is a faith-based organization. One of its beliefs is that sexual conduct
outside of a traditional marriage is immoral. It would be difficult for CLS to
sincerely and effectively convey a message of disapproval of certain types of
conduct if, at the same time, it must accept members who engage in that
conduct. CLS's beliefs about sexual morality are among its defining values;
forcing it to accept as members those who engage in or approve of homosexual
conduct would cause the group as it currently identifies itself to cease to exist.
We have no difficulty concluding that SIU's application of its nondiscrimination
policies in this way burdens CLS's ability to express its ideas.
Id.
119 408 U.S. 169 (1972). Healy addressed First Amendment protections for student
organizations in the context of university recognition of and subsidies for the student
groups.
120 Truth 1, 499 F. 3d 999, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 188 (1972)).
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Truth has not established that its policy of excluding persons
who do not share Christian values from its general membership
has any expressive content, let alone that this policy
communicates a message consistent with the views of the club's
organizers. Truth has thus failed to show the required
incidental infringement of a First Amendment interest.
1 21
Similarly, the Kane district court relied heavily on O'Brien to
categorize the CLS's discriminatory control of its membership as
conduct, not speech. It also relied on O'Brien to find that:
the Nondiscrimination Policy furthers a governmental interest
unrelated to the suppression of free expression - protecting
students from discrimination. Furthermore ... the facts [in
Kane], including Hastings'[s] recognition of a predecessor of
CLS for the previous ten years, confirm that Hastings'[s]
Nondiscrimination Policy is directed at conduct related to the
suppression of expression.1
22
The Kane court also found the last prong of O'Brien, whether the
government intrusion was no greater than necessary, to be easily
satisfied by again categorizing what Hastings prevented as conduct,
not speech. "[Tihe [clourt notes that the Nondiscrimination Policy
only targets the conduct of discrimination. As long as student groups
do not exclude students based on the prohibited categories, the groups
are free to express any beliefs or perspectives they choose." 1
23
Discrimination based on identity generally is conduct without First
Amendment protection unless, for example, the discrimination is a
core aspect of the expressive identity of the organization. Controlling
the ideological message of the association is expressive activity that
should be protected by First Amendment principles, not simplistically
rejected with the label "conduct." The CLS's discriminatory
membership practice of excluding all those who reject the CLS
statement of faith, for example, is prohibited under nondiscrimination
policies precisely because it makes distinctions based on ideology.
21 Id. at 1013. Expressing the same idea more successfully, Eugene Volokh argues
that "antidiscrimination rules are content-neutral" in that the exclusion is "based on
the groups' conduct [of discrimination], not the groups' ideas [that are the reason for
the discrimination]." Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and
Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1930-31 (2006) (citing, among others,
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993)).
122 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27347, at *29-30 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2006).
123 Id. at *31.
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Discrimination based on ideology is almost pure speech, and goes to
the heart of the ability of the expressive association to control its own
message. Under O'Brien, preventing student groups from using
ideological or faith-based criteria for membership is directly related to
suppression of expression, and therefore should trigger First
Amendment protection.
C. Student Groups Need Not Choose Between Recognition and the First
Amendment
The fact that a public school or university provides material or
symbolic support to student organizations within the school's limited
public forum does not diminish those organizations' First Amendment
protections within that forum. In an elegant treatment of this issue,
Professor Eugene Volokh argues that a "No Duty to Subsidize
Principle" means that a public university "may decide to make its
classrooms and student group funds ... available only for events at
which people are welcome without regard to religion and sexual
orientation"'24 and that universities can also decide to provide
subsidies "only when the officers are chosen nondiscriminatorily."' 25
However, Volokh's analysis uncharacteristically undervalues the
expressive interests at stake, and overly relies on the theories of Rust v.
Sullivan,126 the closely divided reproductive rights funding case in
which the Court found that government subsidies eviscerated First
Amendment rights. Rust was not a public forum case, however.
Having chosen to create a public forum, 27 a school or university
cannot impose its own viewpoint or content-based rules on the
student organizations. Rather than resting on Rust, the better analysis
124 See Volokh, supra note 121, at 1926.
125 Id. Volokh agrees that imposing nondiscrimination rules on student groups
may not be good policy, because groups that discriminate can contribute to a
"diversity of views" and "ought to be included within general benefit programs aimed
at promoting such diversity." Id. at 1926-27.
126 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
127 In Hazelwood, the court noted that,
The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and
other traditional public forums .... Hence, school facilities may be deemed
to be public forums only if school authorities have "by policy or by practice"
opened those facilities "for indiscriminate use by the general public," or by
some segment of the public, such as student organizations.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citations omitted).
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relies on Healy.128  Healy recognized that schools and universities
cannot ignore free speech rights of student groups simply because they
are operating within a school or university context. The Court held
that "denial of official recognition, without justification, to college
organizations burdens or abridges that associational right." '129 Indeed,
Healy recognized that non-recognition of a student group constituted
a prior restraint, and that a "'heavy burden' rests on the college to
demonstrate the appropriateness of that action."130
Predictably, the Walker and Kane courts addressed this issue too
with polar opposite analyses. In Walker, the Seventh Circuit used the
public forum precedent of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University
of Virginia and relied heavily on Healy to emphasize that subsidized
student organizations in a public forum are private speakers.1 3 ' The
court rejected the law school's claim that rather than being a "forced
inclusion" case, such as Dale or Hurley, this was a simple case of
whether an association could benefit from institutional recognition.'32
In contrast, Judge Wood's dissent distinguished Healy and Dale
because "CLS is trying to force an affiliation between itself and a state
institution." 133
Also predictably, the district court decision in Kane found that the
context of university recognition limited any otherwise applicable
First Amendment rights. The district court emphasized Boy Scouts of
America v. Wyman, 34 in which the court upheld Connecticut's policy
of excluding the Boy Scouts from a workplace contribution program (a
subsidy) because the Boy Scouts failed to abide by the program's
nondiscrimination policy. The court should have distinguished
128 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
129 Id. at 181. The Court continued, "Freedoms such as these are protected not
only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle
governmental interference." Id. at 183 (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 184 (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-16 (1931)).
131 See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 860-61 (2006) (citing
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995))
(explaining difference between government funding of private groups to spread
government-controlled message and government funding of private groups simply to
encourage diversity of views from private speakers); see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 233 (2000).
132 See Walker, 453 F.3d at 864.
133 Id. at 875 (Wood, J., dissenting). Judge Wood worried that student
organizations that want to discriminate based on race should be required to sustain
themselves without state support, "even if it could root such a membership policy in a
religious text." Id.
134 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2003).
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Wyman, however, because it did not involve a public forum. The
creation of a public forum protects strong expressive association
rights, even in the school context.
D. Attention to the Interplay of Belief, Status, and Conduct Is Required
First Amendment expressive association rights protect a group's
ability to control its message by controlling its membership. Thus, an
expressive association's right to control its membership based on belief
or ideology is a relatively easy case. As reflected in the varying
approaches of the Second and Ninth Circuits in Hsu and Truth, religion
adds some categorical confusion because it is both a protected belief and
the prohibited exclusionary category of identity. Belief and identity also
may implicate behavior. Describing someone as a Christian, or as gay,
suggests something about identity, belief, and behavior. A question that
divided the Hsu panel - whether some of the more secular or social
activities of Walking on Water could be led by non-Christians -
demonstrates the complex interplay between belief, identity, and
behavior. The Hsus claimed that all activities of the Walking on Water
club were meant to glorify Jesus Christ, and therefore all officers needed
to be Christians.1 35 From the position of that faith, planning a picnic for
the glory of Jesus Christ is a different activity, resulting in a different
picnic, than one planned for a different purpose.
The complexities of belief, identity, and behavior are even more
central in the CLS litigation. First, of course, as with Walking on
Water and Truth, the CLS litigation-backed drive to limit its
membership to those who accept its statement of faith is itself faith-
based activity. It is a statement that those members' faith must be
lived, not simply considered. Just as the Hsus recognize a difference
between a picnic planned for the glory of Jesus Christ and a picnic
planned by a non-believer, the CLS sees a difference between a faith-
based organization with shared commitments and an otherwise
identical organization without the shared commitments.
A Vegetarian Caucus whose membership is bound by a pledge not to
eat meat has a different identity and message than a Vegetarian Caucus
without that pledge. If the CLS indeed exists in large part to address
the question "what does it mean to be a Christian in law?,"
establishing specific behavioral and attitudinal requirements for
membership and leadership appears central to the expressive identity
of the organization.
135 Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 857 (2d Cir. 1996).
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The fact that the CLS shared commitment includes renunciation of
certain sexual activity throws the CLS's litigation into the interlocking
complexities related to belief, identity, and behavior of sexual
orientation. In this context, exclusion on the basis of forbidden belief
(that homosexuality is good) and exclusion on the basis of behavior
(actively engaging in homosexuality) should be distinguished from
exclusion on the basis of status or identity (being homosexual).
Attention to those distinctions suggests that the CLS's exclusion of
anyone who endorses sex outside of marriage is not discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
Dale made this distinction harder to see by blurring the line between
belief and identity, improperly using desire to discriminate as proof of
belief. The Dale Court erred by deferring wholesale to the Boy Scouts'
poorly supported claim that opposition to homosexuality was a core
Boy Scout belief. First Amendment freedoms, however, do require
some deference to the expressive association's self-definition. Judge
Wood may be correct in his Walker dissent that a nondiscrimination
policy protecting people who engage in certain behaviors may be
necessary to defeat the CLS claim. However, such a nondiscrimination
policy would be quite different from typical nondiscrimination
policies, which generally focus on status rather than behavior. Judge
Wood's willingness to move into that arena signals an admirable
impulse to protect sexual minorities, but may not be equally protective
of implicated First Amendment issues.
The CLS cases are especially complex because they combine
exclusion based on religion, and exclusion based on sexual attitudes
and conduct that are imbedded in the religious discrimination. As to
the religious exclusion, discriminating against non-Christians is
discriminating against an expressive category (people who do not
believe in the group's defining faith) that is also an identity category
(people who are the wrong religion). The belief defines the identity.
The courts and parties that analyze these issues in polar opposite ways
either see the discrimination as based on belief, which is permissible, or
see the discrimination as based on identity, which is not. In fact, the
discrimination is both. Protection of expressive association requires
that the discrimination based on belief be recognized and controlling.
The sexual orientation issues also combine multiple aspects. The
CLS claims that it is discriminating based on attitudes about
sexuality.136 The opposing law schools contend that what the CLS
136 E.g., Reply Brief at 19-20, Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2006), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347.
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calls discriminating against certain beliefs (endorsement of
homosexuality) is the same thing as discriminating based on sexual
orientation.'37 In terms of the impact on LGBT students and their
allies, it probably is the same. Protection of expressive association
principles, however, requires a finer analysis. If the CLS in fact does
not impose its belief requirements regarding sexuality on
heterosexuals as well as gay people, the law schools have the better of
the argument. If the evidence establishes that the CLS applies its
beliefs about the immorality of sexual conduct outside of marriage
evenly to heterosexuals and gay people, as the CLS alleges, the conflict
with a policy of nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation
disappears, leaving only the conflict based on religion. With that
simplification, the CLS cases can be understood as analytically
equivalent to the high school cases of Hsu and Truth, again asking
whether a policy against religious discrimination can be asserted
against a faith-based student organization.
For First Amendment purposes, a membership policy requiring
renunciation of homosexual activity is analytically distinct from
discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, the very real
harm to LGBT students and their allies in the educational institution
cannot be so easily erased, and should not be minimized. The First
Amendment requires protection of some hostile private speech, but it
does not require institutional silence or neutrality on sexual
orientation. An educational institution that professes to condemn
discrimination against LGBT students should act affirmatively to
ameliorate the hostile impact of anti-homosexual attitudes, whether
expressed by student clubs that discriminate, student clubs that do not
discriminate, or anyone else.'38
IIl. No MEANINGFUL THEORY OF EQUALITY OR PRACTICE OF
NONDISCRIMINATION IS AT STAKE
Equality and nondiscrimination are too precious to be reduced to
the silly formalities of insisting that faith-based organizations cannot
discriminate on the basis of faith. We do not really expect student
organizations to ignore their defining purposes in selecting members
and officers, and the pretense that we do is causing an unnecessary
137 E.g., Brief of Appellees at 8-9, 9 n.8, Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW.
138 See, e.g., Chai Feldblum, SolomonResponse.Org, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
solomon/smaterials.html (last visited June 26, 2008) (providing examples of activities
that institutions and students can undertake to protest and ameliorate presence of
discriminatory employers on campus).
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and harmful battle that pits equality for LGBT people against First
Amendment rights of students.
Consider a student who votes for the Christian candidate to be the
President of the Christian Student Association. The student believes
the non-Christian candidate is generally more capable, but she thinks
that a Christian should lead the Christian student organization. As a
normative matter, nothing is wrong with that preference. It is neither
immoral nor unjust, nor is it invidious discrimination. 39
Student organizations that do not object to formal
nondiscrimination policies may in fact endorse positions regarding
gender relations and sexual orientation that are highly offensive or
discriminatory to other students, and perhaps directly contrary to the
institution's nondiscrimination values. A conservative religious
student organization that does not formally discriminate based on any
protected status, may advance a substantive position regarding sex
roles and sexual orientation that is directly contrary to a law school's
commitment to equal opportunity for women and sexual minorities.
The group's formal inclusive membership policy could be
accompanied by a relentless pattern of heterosexual male leadership,
antiwoman and anti-LGBT speakers, and a hostile atmosphere toward
women and LGBT students. If nondiscrimination really only means
formal policies of membership and leadership inclusion - even when
accompanied by habits, patterns, policies, politics, and cultures of
discrimination and exclusion - it does not mean much. Providing a
law school's blessing, sanction, approval, or recognition to a group
that actively promotes sex stereotypes and undermines LGBT rights
simply because the group does not formally discriminate regarding
membership or leadership promotes a watered-down notion of
discrimination and equality.
Indeed, I fear that schools and universities may fetishize these
formal nondiscrimination policies when applied against unpopular
student organizations, while ignoring violations that are long-standing
aspects of student life." Hidden majoritarian premises and habits
render the sex-segregated clubs and sports invisible, in spite of
"I In Hsu, the Second Circuit recognized that the school district's argument that
students could elect leadership based on religious affiliation would be simply hiding
the same religious-based leadership determination behind student voting preferences,
denying non-Christians the same opportunity to serve as leaders. 85 F.3d at 861.
140 Cf. Kevin W. Saunders, The Need for a Two (or More) Tiered First Amendment to
Provide for the Protection of Children, 79 CHi-KENT L. REV. 257, 273 (2004) (asserting
that "the real harm" in Tinker was "attempt to squelch one side of a debate and only
allow the expression of the other").
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nondiscrimination policies explicitly including sex. 141 For example,
cheerleading squads, sports clubs, and service clubs routinely
distinguish between boys and girls, or men and women. 42 In Truth,
for example, the court invalidated the Christian organization's ability
to restrict membership based on commitment to Jesus Christ, but was
initially untroubled by the sex-segregated Girls' and Men's Honor
Clubs.143  Perhaps similarly, in Kane, although many Hastings's
student organizations have discriminatory defining interests in their
bylaws, when considering less controversial groups Hastings interprets
those references as "informational only."'
14 4
Questioning the focus directed at formal nondiscrimination policies
is consistent with substantive, antisubordination theories of equality.
Context matters. Affirmative action is not the same as invidious
discrimination. The hyper-attention to enforcement of equality claims
that are not actually sought (the right of the Muslim or Jew or
Buddhist to join and lead the CLS) shares some traits with a
formalized, colorblind version of equality, in which formal niceties
substitute for true equality. The formal right of everyone to join every
student organization may be a distraction from more serious issues.
Too much focus on facially correct, neutral regimes in educational
institutions may foster an environment in which nobody notices that
young women are subjected to catcalls in the corridors, or that no
people of color are on the law review.
The main value of the institution's insistence that student
organizations abide by nondiscrimination policies is symbolic:
insisting that student organizations abide by institutional
nondiscrimination policies is one way to send a message about the
value that the institution places on equality, inclusivity, and welcome.
Institutions can and should find ways to send equally or more
meaningful messages of nondiscrimination and equality that do not
suppress First Amendment association rights of student groups.
141 Cf. Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 711 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating KKK
improperly excluded for discrimination where other discriminating groups allowed to
receive government benefit).
142 See Cuffley, 208 F.3d at 711; see also Volokh, supra note 121, at 1968 n.185
(according to Volokh, "striking down the exclusion of the KKK from a generally
available government program that purportedly excluded discriminating groups,
because other less controversial discriminating groups - such as the Knights of
Columbus - were not excluded").
143 See Truth 1, 499 F.3d 999, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2007). Why not men and women,
or boys and girls?
144 Brief of Appellee at 4, Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484JSW (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 17, 2006), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347.
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IV. SCHOOLS AND STUDENT GROUPS NEED SEPARATE EXPRESSIVE
IDENTITIES
Conceptualizing the expressive identity of the institution as separate
from the expressive identity of any individual student organization is
an important step for both First Amendment and equality goals. Being
more honest about the distinction between the speech of the school
and the speech of student organizations is a better way to educate
students about freedom. When the government sets up a limited
public forum, the speech within the forum is private speech, not
government speech. Conceptualizing student organizations as
branches of the school and thereby bound by the school's
nondiscrimination policy serves up a watered-down version of free
expression and equality.
Recognizing and reinforcing that student organizations are private
and separate from the school or university also helps to accommodate
the current Establishment Clause doctrine related to religious student
organizations, protect against the potential erosion of student speech
in the name of conformity to school or university "mission," and
bolster the expressive identity of the school or university.
A. Greater Separation Between Student Groups and Schools Can Protect
Establishment Clause Values
A solid, relentless series of Supreme Court Establishment Clause
decisions, including Widmar v. Vincent,145 Rosenberger,46 Board of
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,47 Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,14' and Good News Club v.
Milford Central School,149  has minimized Establishment Clause
14 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
146 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
147 In Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990) (plurality), the Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to
the Equal Access Act, which creates a right of religious, political, and other kinds of
noncurricular student organizations to exist at high schools. "To the extent that a
religious club is merely one of many different student-initiated voluntary clubs,
students should perceive no message of government endorsement of religion." Id. at
252. The Court did not reach the question whether the First Amendment requires the
statutory free speech rights created by the Equal Access Act.
148 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
149 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (assuming, per Justice Thomas (rather than deciding), that
after-school use policies constituted limited public forum, id. at 106; limited public
forums can be limited in who gets access but "restriction must not discriminate
against speech on the basis of viewpoint," id. at 106, and "the restriction must be
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objections and allowed religious, proselytizing student organizations a
place at public universities, colleges, high schools, and primary
schools. Separationist arguments have been defeated, and the Court
has now conclusively established that schools and universities that
prohibit such religious organizations on Establishment Clause
grounds are discriminating impermissibly against religion.
This Establishment Clause shift requires other doctrines and
attitudes to adjust. Most clearly, the shift in Establishment Clause
doctrine requires schools and universities to rethink their relationship
and affiliation with student organizations. Specifically, it requires
universities and schools to disengage, provide less oversight, and less
of an imprimatur for student organizations that are recognized as part
of a limited public forum. Separating the identity of the institution
from the identity of the student group is necessary to accommodate
this new, securely entrenched landscape that brings student religious
organizations to every level of schoolhouse.15° The presence of
religious organizations requires schools and universities to address
seriously the potential for endorsement in their relationships with
religious student groups.
Strong arguments support an Establishment Clause jurisprudence
that would keep all religious activity further away from public schools
and universities.151 However, those arguments have not prevailed.
Religious student organizations are now constitutionally protected at
the elementary, secondary, and university levels. Therefore, values of
'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,"' id. at 107 (citation omitted);
exclusion of religious group constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination
following Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel, id. at 107; "religion is the viewpoint from
which ideas are conveyed," rejecting distinction between worship and other activities,
id. at 112 n.4).
"' See, e.g., Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002). Prince concerned the
attempts of an 11th grader, Tausha Prince, to get recognition for her Christian Bible
club, called The World Changers, whose purposes included to "address issues of
interest to students from a religious perspective" and "'celebrating' and 'sharing' the
Gospel of Jesus Christ." Id. at 1077. The specific issue in the case was whether the
school district was complying with the Equal Access Act by setting up two tiers of
students groups, relegating religious groups to a less favorable status. Id. The court
found that the school district had violated the Equal Access Act and the First
Amendment (because of viewpoint discrimination in denying access to the yearbook,
A/V equipment, school supplies, and vehicles not covered by the Equal Access Act),
although there was no right for the religious organization to operate during school
hours during "student/staff time." Id. at 1087-89 (discussing rationale for finding that
religious organizations could not operate during school hours).
15' E.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CI. L. REV.
195,195 (1992).
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pluralism, freedom of association, and free speech are better served by
acknowledging that when a school or university establishes a limited
public forum for student organizations, the student organizations
constitute private entities, with identities distinct and separate from
that of the school or university.
Indeed, these Establishment Clause decisions rest on the
understanding that student organizations' religious communication in a
limited public forum constitutes "private" religious speech. For
example, in rejecting any argument of coercion, Justice Scalia noted in
his Good News Club concurrence that "so-called 'peer pressure,' if it can
even be considered coercion, is, when it arises from private activities,
one of the attendant consequences of a freedom of association that is
constitutionally protected."'52 A student group's speech will be more
clearly "private" if the school does not attempt to impose its norms and
values, including those about nondiscrimination.
This argument that student groups are engaging in "private speech"
echoes Justice Marshall's admonishment in Mergens."3  Marshall
advised that holding the Equal Access Act permissible under the
Establishment Clause required schools to disassociate more actively
from the noncurricular student groups. The school at issue in
Mergens, for example, created fora "dedicated to promoting
fundamental values and citizenship as defined by the school. The
Establishment Clause does not forbid the operation of the Act in such
circumstances, but it does require schools to change their relationship
to their fora so as to disassociate themselves effectively from religious
clubs' speech."1 4 The idea that religious student groups have values
that are consistent with the public educational institution's own values
is a pretense that risks public endorsement of the religious
perspective. This reasoning is itself sufficient grounds for faith-based
student organizations to be exempted from institutional
nondiscrimination policies.
152 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 121 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
"What is at play here is not coercion, but the compulsion of ideas - and the private
right to exert and receive that compulsion (or to have one's children receive it) is
protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses." Id. (citations omitted). "A
priest has as much liberty to proselytize as a patriot." Id.
153 496 U.S. 226, 262 (1990) (Marshall,J., concurring).
154 Id. at 262-63.
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B. Greater Separation Between Student Groups and Schools Protects
Student Speech Rights
Not surprisingly, the logic of current First Amendment doctrine
related to student speech rests on how closely the student speech is
tied to the institution's speech. Most prominently, for example, the
concept of "school-sponsored" speech, which the Court understood as
speech that "students, parents, and other members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school,"'55 was
determinative in Hazelwood. Proponents of robust free speech rights
for students have an interest in delineating and emphasizing the
separation of student speech from school or university speech.
Extending the school's nondiscrimination policy to student
organizations blurs their independent identities.
Morse also suggests the pragmatic imperative of separating students'
speech from the policy or mission of the school or university. Morse
reaffirmed the centrality of the question whether the school apparently
endorses "school-sponsored" speech, but found that the school was
not reasonably appearing to endorse the "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"
banner in question. 156 In Morse, the Court did not accept the
invitation to permit school officials to censor speech interfering with
the school's "educational mission,"'157 but its apparent willingness to
subsume students' First Amendment rights into a vague notion of
school policy is troubling.'58 The Morse Court recognized prevention
of drug abuse as an important, perhaps compelling governmental
purpose. 59 Equally important, Morse emphasized that the school had
an established policy against illegal drug use. Therefore, Morse can be
criticized as permitting the censorship of student speech because it
was expressing a viewpoint contrary to the viewpoint of the school,
even without any apparent endorsement problem.
15' Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
156 "Kuhlmeier does not control this case because no one would reasonably believe
that Frederick's banner bore the school's imprimatur." Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct.
2618, 2627 (2007). In other words, Morse does not rest on an endorsement theory.
Other than its troubling hints that student speech can be censored if it is contrary to
official school policy, Morse has little relevance to this question.
157 Id. at 2637.
158 A student group formed to engage in illegal drug use can be prohibited even
without Morse. That is the kind of conduct vs. speech distinction that makes sense.
Or, imagine a student organization formed to promote the idea of illegal drug use. Or
using Justice Stevens's turn, imagine a student group formed to advocate legalizing
marijuana bong hits, whether or not for Jesus. Morse surely does not carve out some
sort of exception for drug-related student organizations.
' Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628.
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In addition to minimizing the political aspect of the message (how
can "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" be both advocating drug use and not be
political speech?), the Morse Court seemed to be reinforcing a
preferred unity between the viewpoint of the school and the viewpoint
of the student speaker. A continuing preference for that unity would
eviscerate student speech protection. Enforcing a unity between the
nondiscrimination policy of a school and the nondiscrimination policy
of a student organization would be consistent with this preference for
unification of viewpoint. The potential unification of institutional and
student viewpoints is even more wrong in the context of a limited
public forum.
C. Greater Separation Between Student Groups and Schools Protects
Institutional Expressive Association Interests
Separation of the message of the school or university from the
message of the student organization enhances the power of the
school's message where it has a message (e.g., nondiscrimination) and
enhances the perceived and actual neutrality when the school is
appropriately neutral. In Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 160 the Court had trouble
seeing the expressive interests of law schools. The Court rejected the
law schools' argument that the Solomon Amendment impermissibly
coerced the law schools to violate their own policies of
nondiscrimination, thereby impermissibly changing the law schools'
expressive identity. The FAIR Court said that military recruiters
"come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire
students-not to become members of the school's expressive
association."161 The content of the school or university's own
expressive association will become clearer if it is not muddled with the
multitude of messages of the student groups that it facilitates through
its establishment of a public forum.162
In his dissent in Walker, Judge Wood worried that:
the indirect impact of CLS's recognition of a student group
maintaining such a policy is that [the law school],
intentionally or not, may be seen as tolerating such
discrimination. Given that universities have a compelling
a~ See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47
(2006).
161 Id. at 69.
162 See also the court's recognition that Georgetown University has an interest in
not being associated with pro-gay positions in Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown
University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1, 39 (D.C. 1987).
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interest in obtaining diverse student bodies, requiring a
university to include exclusionary groups might undermine
their ability to attain such diversity.1 63
Judge Wood concluded by using FAIR, suggesting that the CLS "is
trying to force SIU's Law School to accept a 'member' (that is, a
recognized student organization) that SIU does not desire. The whole
point of this litigation is to transform CLS from an outsider, like the
military recruiters in FAIR, into an insider."'" Whether or not it
admits non-Christian members, no Christian group should have
"insider" status in a public institution. Conceptualizing the expressive
identities of the institution and the student group as having very
distinct voices would better address Judge Wood's concern about the
blurring of the two.
In short, a renewed emphasis on the distinction between the school
or university as speaker, and the student organization as speaker,
should enable a stronger institutional viewpoint. The student
organization can be religious, political, or otherwise ideological. The
public school or university cannot have a religious perspective, but it
can have a strong position on nondiscrimination, even when some
student organizations do not. Indeed, the institution's viewpoint that
LGBT students are full members of the high school or law school
community arguably would be diminished if it appears to embrace
ideologically antihomosexuality student organizations, requiring only
that they agree to abide by formal nondiscrimination policies.
V. LIMITING PRINCIPLES AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Public forums set up by schools and universities for student
expression are relatively rare and precious free speech zones.
Permitting even exclusionary student expressive associations to
flourish does not need to lead to either the evisceration of institutional
nondiscrimination policies or creation of hostile educational
environments. However, limiting principles are necessary to make
sure this is so.
163 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 875 (7th Cir. 2006) (Wood, J.,
dissenting).
114 Id. at 876.
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A. Rights of Exclusion Should Be Limited to Student Expressive
Associations Within a Public Forum Whose Core Identity Requires the
Exclusion
The expressive association freedom to control membership should
be limited to constraints on membership and leadership that are
central to the mission and belief structure of the organization. In
other words, the chess club defines itself by interest in chess, not by
religious faith. Of course, there could be a Christian Chess Club.
The Board of Regents of the University of California argued in its
brief in Kane that exemption from nondiscrimination policies for
student organizations would be no different from a guest lecturer
limiting his or her students to those of a specific race or religion. 65
The example is inapposite, however. The lecturer is presenting a
program on behalf of the institution, whose own policies of
inclusiveness should apply. The group that gathers to hear a guest
lecturer has no expressive association interests protected by the First
Amendment. Thus, the school or university has the ability to require
open attendance at a lecture. Recognizing the core association rights
of expressive student groups to control their own membership or
leadership criteria does not require abandonment of institutional
control in any other area. It does not even require any change in
policies that student group meetings be open to all students.
B. Rights of Exclusion Should Be Limited to Membership and Leadership
of the Student Organization, Not Necessarily Attendance at Meetings
First Amendment protection for exclusionary membership and
leadership requirements does not similarly mandate that a student
group may restrict attendance at its events and meetings. Leaders and
members have control over the agenda and conduct of a meeting or
event, but the same principles of autonomy over message do not
support exclusionary policies regarding mere presence. Therefore, in
creating a public forum of student groups, the school or university may
limit the organizations' membership and leadership to students, and
may require that general meetings and events be open to all students.
165 Brief for the Board of Regents as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hastings at 3,
Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2006), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347.
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C. Rights of Exclusion Should Not Carry Over to Student Groups'
Commercial Activities
The First Amendment offers less protection for expressive
associations whose exclusionary policies undermine economic
opportunities for those who are excluded.'66 Therefore, the CLS
would have no right to conduct a members-only job fair, for example.
Similarly, Professor Volokh notes that exclusion from student groups
is not likely to cause systematic harm such as depriving someone of an
education, livelihood, or shelter.167
D. Institutional Prohibitions on Harassment Would Continue in Full
Force Within the School or University
Exclusion from a private student organization is not the same thing as
targeted harassment. Protecting student safety and freedom from
harassment will continue to be an important aspect of school or
university culture and duty. In fact, separating the expressive identity of
the institution from the expressive identity of the student organization
may free the institution to adopt strong protections, such as for students
who are sexual minorities, beyond those required by statute.
E. Tinker's Limitation for Disruptive Activity Applies
Under Tinker, student expressive associations have no right to
conduct their affairs in ways that "materially and substantially disrupt
the work and discipline of the school."' 68 The principles limiting the
power of heckler's vetoes should assure that opponents of the
exclusionary student group would not be able to shut it down through
disruptive activities.16 9 However, the Tinker requirement would also
apply with full force to disruptive activities by the student
166 See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18-20
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding that predominantly commercial
organizations are not entitled to First Amendment association right to be free from
antidiscrimination provisions); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (recognizing compelling governmental interest in ensuring
that women have equal access to business contacts); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 631, 634 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing minimal constitutional
protection for commercial association).
167 See Volokh, supra note 121, at 1927.
"6 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); see also
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
169 See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd
County, 258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 689-90 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
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organization itself. For example, the Hsu court suggested that if the
club were reduced to squabbling, rather than becoming entangled with
questions of religious worthiness, the school could disband the club
under the "materially disruptive" test of Tinker.7°
F. Exclusionary Student Groups Should Be Required to Disclose Their
Exclusionary Policies
Although purely private expressive associations enjoy rights of
privacy about information like membership lists, 171 expressive
associations in the public school or university public forum do not
have such rights. Institutions can condition recognition of any
student group on that group's disclosure and announcement of
membership and leadership policies. Student groups wishing to
discriminate should be required to announce the basis of their
discriminatory policy. 172 Being forced to announce one's exclusionary
principles could inhibit those principles from taking hold, with the
requirement of articulation operating as a moderating influence. 173
Moreover, perhaps in many ways excluded students benefit from
knowing the hostile attitudes of their fellow students, rather than
having them hidden under a very thin veneer of state-imposed pseudo-
respect, such as within pockets of political support for LGBT rights.
174
G. Parental Permission Slips Could Be Required for Student
Organizations That Are Not Open to All Students
Depending on the age of the students, schools could require
parental permission slips for all student organizations, or for any that
have exclusionary policies. In Good News Club, Justice Thomas found
no Establishment Clause violation in part because "the Club's
meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored by the school,
170 Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 867 (2d Cir. 1996).
171 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (recognizing associational
and speech rights not to disclose membership lists).
172 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Facilitating Boycotts of Discriminatory Organizations
Through an Informed Association Statute, 87 MINN. L. REV. 481,496 (2002).
173 See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 12, at 848 n.35 ("[T]he implicit requirement that
one must articulate clearly a bigoted message in order to retain the ability to exclude
unwanted members for bigoted reasons may serve as a disincentive to discriminate for
those groups who wish to forswear a reputation of bigotry.").
174 Regarding the faux-equality of imposing nondiscriminatory membership
requirements, id. at 878 ("Forced methods of generating culture suffer authenticity
problems that undercut its value.").
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and open to any student who obtained parental consent, not just to
Club Members."'175 Justice Thomas claimed that the required parental
permission means that any coercion would be of the parents, not of
the elementary school children. 76  Whatever the strength of Justice
Thomas's coercion analysis in Good News Club, parental permission
slips could moderate the potentially disruptive or hostile impact of
exclusionary student organizations.
H. If Any Group Came to "Dominate the Forum," the First Amendment
Right to Exclude Would Evaporate Along with the Public Forum
In general, the answer to exclusionary student groups is more
student groups.17 7 If any single student organization became so big
that it "dominated the forum," the public forum would have
disappeared and the independence of the student organization from
the school or university would have been destroyed. 78 In that case,
the dominant student organization would no longer be private and
independent, and would lose any expressive association right to
control membership.
I. The School or University Should Disclaim Any Control over Student
Organizations' Exclusionary Policies
The school or university can provide specific disclaimers that explain
the constitutional rights of expressive associations and alert everyone
that student organizations are not within the general nondiscrimination
175 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001).
176 Id. at 115.
117 See Shiffrin, supra note 12, at 878 (explaining that "the excluded have the viable
option to generate robust associations of their own and to create their own sites of
culture and mutual recognition and trust," but noting that "[tIhese alternatives may...
lack the social cachet of, and social power wielded by, majority, mainstream groups").
178 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 127-28 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Justice Breyer's concurrence in
Good News Club emphasizes the procedural posture (reversal of grant of summary
judgment for school district) and suggests that certain facts, "[tihe time of day, the
age of the children . . . and other specific circumstances are relevant in helping to
determine whether, in fact, the Club 'so dominates' the 'forum' that, in the children's
minds, 'a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of
approval."' Id. at 128; e.g., id. at 134, 140 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 851 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) (noting that Establishment
Clause did not bar religious student group from using public university's meeting
space for worship as well as discussion)).
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policies for access to educational opportunities.179 Such disclaimers can
minimize any apparent endorsement of discrimination.
J. School Officials with Younger Students Have Greater Leeway to
Control Student Organizations
Although the general principles that I have described are applicable
to both high school and university students, the specific
implementation can differ because high school students do not
necessarily have the full First Amendment rights of university students
and adults."' The age of the students in question, whether in grade
school, high school, or university, can determine the depth of First
Amendment protections required. 81 More infringements may be
justified at the elementary than at the high school level, and more at
the high school than at the university level.' 82
CONCLUSION
The oppression of and discrimination against LGBT youth in many
schools and communities should not be minimized. Interpreting the
First Amendment rights of student expressive associations to extend to
exclusionary practices may cause harm to the excluded students.
Freedom of speech causes harm. Pornography causes harm, as does
179 In Widmar, for example, the university published a student handbook with an
explicit disclaimer that "the university's name will not 'be identified in any way with
the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its
members."' Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 142 (Souter,J., dissenting) (quoting Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n. 14 (1981)).
180 See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 12, at 880-87, 882 (arguing for right of associations
to exclude "all presuppose an agent with life experience and at least the maturity age
brings, one who has had opportunities to develop her autonomous capacities such
that she may be reasonably thought to be responsible for the exercise of her
autonomy").
181 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 142-43 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting "special
protection required for those in the elementary grades in the school forum" (citing
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 620 n.69
(1989)). Justice Souter continues, "We have held the difference between college
students and grade school pupils to be a 'distinction [that] warrants a difference in
constitutional results."' Id. at 143 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 573, 584
n.5 (1987)).
182 See id. at 115 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390
(1985)) ("[S]ymbolism of a union between church and state is most likely to influence
children of tender years, whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently
are the function of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice."); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (explaining that elementary children are more
impressionable than older children).
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other protected hate speech.1 3 I am hopeful, though, that students
who are harmed by exclusion from student organizations will take
advantage of the same culture of free expression in multiple ways,
whether by forming other organizations or through individual speech.
People who are discriminated against have a powerful ally in the
First Amendment. The amazing importance of the Equal Access Act'8
for LGBT youth, and for LGBT justice generally, provides an
important lesson. Congress enacted the Equal Access Act to make
high school safe for traditional religious groups, and it is doing that,
sometimes to the detriment of LGBT youth. However, the equally big,
perhaps even bigger beneficiary of the Equal Access Act is LGBT gay-
straight alliances, of which there are now thousands in high schools
across the country." 5  The widespread presence of those pro-gay
student organizations has created safety for countless LGBT youth,
and has changed public attitudes about LGBT justice. Overwhelming
evidence shows that attitudes about homosexuality are significantly
related to age, with younger adults consistently more supportive of
strong freedom for sexual minorities.8 6 This remarkable change in
attitudes has been fueled in part by popular culture, and in part by the
presence of organized LGBT organizations in high schools and
colleges. Those organizations have been able to exist in places where
dominant public opinion does not support LGBT freedom only
because First Amendment freedoms have protected them. Thus,
recent history shows that progressive change in the climate for LGBT
people, especially youth, is fueled by free speech and expressive
"' See Shiffrin, supra note 12, at 878 (explaining harms of exclusion "are a real,
substantial cost of the protection of freedom of association, just as there are similar
costs associated with other protected forms of expression that permit the voicing of
hateful or ignorant sentiments").
184 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a), (b) (2000). The Equal Access Act, passed in 1984,
requires public secondary schools that permit any student-initiated non-curricular
student group to allow other non-curricular student groups, however unpopular. 20
U.S.C. § 4071 (1984).
185 See, e.g., Straights & Gays for Equal. v. Osseo Area Schs., 471 F.3d 908 (8th Cir.
2006) (upholding right of Gay Straight Alliance pursuant to Equal Access Act); White
County High Sch. Peers v. White County Sch. Dist., 2:06-CV-29-WCO, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47955 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2006) (same); Boyd County High Sch. Gay
Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (same).
186 E.g., THE HARRIS POLL #91, Sept. 18, 2007 (explaining that 49% of those ages 18
to 35 support gay rights, compared to 37% of those ages 43 to 61 and 31% of those 62
and older); Tolerance for Gay Rights at High-Water Mark, GALLUP POLL, May 29, 2007
(noting that 75% of ages 18 to 34 agreed that homosexuality is "acceptable alternative
lifestyle" compared to 45% of ages 55 and above).
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association rights. That is the lesson in freedom and equality that we
should be teaching our students.
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